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JUSTICE THOMAS'S KELO DISSENT: THE PERILOUS
AND POLITICAL NATURE OF PUBLIC PURPOSE
Carol Necole Brown*
INTRODUCTION
The exercise of eminent domain in the United States has victimized
politically disadvantaged groups like minorities and the poor the most.' As
Professor Ilya Somin aptly noted in his recent book, The Grasping Hand,
"[w]ealthy and politically connected property owners rarely suffer from
economic development ... takings, because politicians and developers are
usually savvy enough to avoid targeting them."2 Whether it is government
taking private property for highways, roads, or schools, the common thread
that weaves through all of these examples-from the beginning of the coun-
try until now-is that political actors have always decided whose property
was to be taken.3 Since the beginning of time, the least powerful groups
have always had the least political influence.4 And, people with the least
political power are the people who pay the price of eminent domain.'
Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law. Thank you to the University of
Richmond School of Law and Dean Wendy Perdue and Corinna Barrett Lain for their support of this
project. Thank you to my parents, the late Allen S. Brown and the late Valerie J. Brown, as well as to
my husband, Paul Clinton Harris, Sr., and my daughters Reagan Mackenzie Harris and Hannah Madison
Harris.
1 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 521-22 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Brief of
Amici Curiae NAACP et al. in Support of Petitioners at 3, Kelo, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (No. 04-108),
2004 WL 2811057, at *3; Carol Necole Brown, Kelo v. City of New London and the Prospects for
Development After a Natural Disaster, in PRIVATE PROPERTY, COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, AND
EMINENT DOMAIN 149, 164 (ed. Robin Paul Malloy 2008); Dick M. Carpenter & John K. Ross, Testing
O'Connor and Thomas: Does the Use of Eminent Domain Target Poor and Minority Communities?, 46
URB. STUD. 2447, 2456 (2009).
2 ILYA SOMIN, THE GRASPING HAND: KELO V. CITY OF NEW LONDON AND THE LIMITS OF
EMINENT DOMAIN 101 (2015).
3 Brief of Amici Curiae NAACP et al. in Support of Petitioners, supra note 1, at 11 (discussing
economic statistics that prove that historically disenfranchised groups are disproportionately and nega-
tively impacted by economic-development takings); Kevin Douglas Kuswa, Suburbification, Segrega-
tion, and the Consolidation of the Highway Machine, 3 J.L. SOC'Y 31, 53 (2002) (discussing the Inter-
state Highway Act of 1956 and its contribution to housing discrimination); Charles Toutant, Alleging
Race-Based Condemnation, N.J. L.J., Aug. 2, 2004, at 357.
4 Brief of Amici Curiae NAACP et al. in Support of Petitioners, supra note 1, at 11 (stating that
racial and ethnic minorities and the elderly and economically disadvantaged suffer disproportionately
from economic-development takings because they are easier economic and political targets and are
therefore less able to contest government's actions); Douglas J. Amy, What is Really Wrong with Gov-
ernment, GOV'T IS GOOD, http://www.govemmentisgood.com/articles.php?aid=23 (last visited Jan. 9,
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The United States Supreme Court in Kelo v. City of New London6 dou-
bled down on this tragedy when it blessed economic-development takings.7
An economic-development taking refers to the government's use of the
power of eminent domain to take private property for the public purpose of
economic development--creating economic advantages.' Often times, eco-
nomic-development takings like the one in Kelo take private property from
one party and transfer it to another private party. The notion of economic-
development takings is a recently developed euphemism for the broad exer-
cise of government power, cloaked in the Fifth Amendment's Takings
Clause.9
Central to understanding the Takings Clause is the public use re-
striction-the requirement that when government takes private property, it
is for a public use. ° The public use restriction, which includes taking pri-
vate property and transferring it to another private owner for economic-
development purposes, has been historically constrained to instances in
which the public had a right of use." But the key word is "use," and that is
where Kelo comes in.
According to Justice Stevens, writing for a 5-4 majority in Kelo, the
Supreme Court first embraced public use broadly to include public purpos-
es at the end of the nineteenth century when it began applying the Fifth
Amendment to the states. 2 Justice Stevens cites to the Court's decision in
Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley3 for support. Interestingly, this is
2016) ("This is why many people are frustrated and disappointed with our political system. Instead of a
democracy where all citizens have an equal say in the governing process, some organizations and indi-
viduals have a disproportionate and unfair influence over what the government does. The result is that
the power and greed of the few too often win out over the needs of the many.").
5 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 521 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("Allowing the government to take property
solely for public purposes is bad enough, but extending the concept of public purpose to encompass any
economically beneficial goal guarantees that these losses will fall disproportionately on poor communi-
ties. Those communities are not only systematically less likely to put their lands to the highest and best
social use, but are also the least politically powerful."); SOMIN, supra note 2, at 101; Carpenter & Ross,
supra note 1, at 2455-57.
6 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
7 Id. at 479.
8 Id. at 491 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Kelo v. City of New London, No. 557299, 2002
WL 500238, at *36 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 13, 2002), aff'd in part, rev 'd in part, 843 A.2d 500 (Conn.
2004), aff'd, 545 U.S. 469 (2005)).
9 Brown, supra note 1, at 150.
10 U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.").
" See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 511-13 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (discussing early uses of the eminent
domain power under the Mill Acts as support for government authority to take under the Fifth Amend-
ment only if the public or the government actually uses the property taken).
12 Id. at 479-80 (citing Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 158-64 (1896)).
13 164 U.S. 112 (1896).
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the same Court that decided the infamous Plessy v. Ferguson,4 which gave
legal sanction to the majoritarian view of the time that separate but equal
public accommodations passed constitutional muster. 5
After this shift from public use to public purpose, the Court continued
on a path of ever-expanding interpretation of public purpose. 6 Eventually,
in Kelo, the Court permitted use of eminent domain for economic develop-
ment. According to this broad view of public purpose, transferring property
from one private party to another in order to create jobs, increase tax reve-
nue, and revitalize communities are all public purposes, "reflecting [the
Court's] longstanding policy of deference to legislative judgments in this
field.""7
In contrast, Justice Thomas dissented in Kelo, cautioning against the
majority's limitless approach to the limitations imposed by the Public Use
Clause on government's ability to exercise its eminent-domain power. 8
Justice Thomas had the unfortunate truth of the vastly disparate uses of
eminent domain clearly in sight when he cautioned for a narrow under-
standing of public use, supported by state limits on the exercise of eminent
domain relating back to the early Mill Acts"' at the time of the country's
founding."0 Less deference to legislative prerogatives, more adherence to
original meaning-namely, more fairness and security for vulnerable
groups-these are themes that can be drawn from Justice Thomas's Kelo
dissent.
This Essay submits that the arguments that Justice Thomas constructed
in his dissent were appropriately focused on the inherently political nature
of the Fifth Amendment's Public Use Clause. Unlike the majority, Justice
Thomas recognized that when the Supreme Court broadly interprets the
public use restriction of the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause, and at the
same time defers to political actors in this arena, it fundamentally abdicates
14 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
15 Id. at 550-51; Brad Snyder, What Would Justice Holmes Do (WWJHD)?: Rehnquist's Plessy
Memo, Majoritarianism, and Parents Involved, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 873, 875, 898 (2008).
16 Compare Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 231-32 (1984) (upholding the use of
eminent domain for purposes of land distribution), and Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 34-35 (1954)
(upholding the use of eminent domain to condemn properties for slum clearance), with Kelo, 545 U.S. at
500-501 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (distinguishing the removal of harmful property use to achieve direct
public benefit from the removal of Kelo's "well-maintained home," which was not the source of any
social harm).
17 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 480.
18 Id. at 521-22 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
19 See Dennis Bechara, Eminent Domain and the Rule of Law, 35 FREEMAN 273, 277 (1985)
(explaining that the Mill Acts were statutes enacted by twenty-nine states by 1884, which established
restraint-free mechanisms for establishing mills).
20 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 512-13 (Thomas, J., dissenting); David M. Gold, Eminent Domain and Eco-
nomic Development: The Mill Acts and the Origins of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 21 J.
LIBERTARIAN STUD. 101, 101 (2007). See generally Abram P. Staples, The MillActs, 9 VA. L.REG. 265
(1903) (defining the Mill Act statutes of the several states and their purposes).
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its constitutional responsibility. 1 By deferring to political actors in this ar-
ea, the Court in Kelo fundamentally abdicated its responsibility and also
adopted a majoritarian doctrinal approach. Further, the Court conflated po-
litical ends with constitutional purposes. And it is for this crucial reason
that the Fifth Amendment aims to insert a check on majoritarian power
through express limitations on government's exercise of eminent domain as
expressed in the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.22
This Essay first discusses the underlying facts of the Kelo decision and
lays a foundation for understanding the intensely political nature of the de-
cision to take private property for economic development in the Fort Trum-
bull area of New London, Connecticut. Second, it explores the Kelo Court's
close hewing to majoritarian views in the realm of the Fifth Amendment's
Public Use Clause. It also explains the inherently political DNA that cours-
es through the majority's public use test and why it is dangerous. Finally,
this Essay addresses the holdout dilemma raised by many scholars in sup-
port of the Kelo majority and offers a solution that addresses holdouts while
remaining true to the original meaning of the Public Use Clause as elo-
quently expressed by Justice Thomas.
I. KELO: A FAILURE IN POLITICAL JUDGMENT
The transfer of property from one private owner to another for eco-
nomic development has always worked to disadvantage historically under-
privileged groups (e.g., minorities, the poor, and the elderly) more than
others.23 And, as the NAACP argued in its Kelo brief, "it is not simply that
the exercise of eminent domain, particularly when the purpose is 'economic
development,' affects the elderly, minorities, and the economically disad-
vantaged more often than it does those with more political and economic
power, but that it affects those groups in different and more profound
ways."24 Such was the case in Kelo. Numerous parties wielded political
influence that ultimately led to the exercise of eminent domain for econom-
ic development in New London, Connecticut. This Part tells the story of the
exercise of political power and judgment in the eminent-domain context in
Kelo.
21 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 514-15 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
22 Id. at 506 (stating that the Public Use Clause of the Fifth Amendment, "originally understood, is
a meaningful limit on the government's eminent domain power").
23 See, e.g., Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 470-71 (Mich.
1981) (per curiam) (Ryan, J., dissenting), overruled by Cty. of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765,
787 (Mich. 2004); Brief of Amici Curiae NAACP et al. in Support of Petitioners, supra note 1, at 10
(providing statistics for economic-development takings that demonstrate the disproportionate impacts on
racial and ethnic minorities and the elderly); Carpenter & Ross, supra note 1, at 2448-49.
24 Brief of Amici Curiae NAACP et al. in Support of Petitioners, supra note 1, at 12.
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The City of New London, a waterfront community with a population
of approximately 25,000, faced big-city problems in the years leading up to
Kelo.25 A study prepared for The American Assembly reported:
The poorest residents of southern New London County were concentrated in New London.
Unemployment was twice the state average and over half of the New London High School
students left before graduation. With just 5.6 square miles of area, New London was also
hampered in raising tax revenues because an unusually high proportion (54%) of city land
and buildings were tax exempt.
26
Various parties influenced the legislative outcomes that gave rise to
the development plan that resulted in targeting New London for economic
development, specifically its historic Fort Trumbull area.2 ' Former Republi-
can Governor John G. Rowland hoped to expand his political base and per-
haps his legacy by promoting economic development in the City of New
London, which was run by a Democratic city government.2 8 Governor Row-
land's administration helped to resuscitate the dormant New London De-
velopment Corporation ("NLDC"), a private nonprofit corporation estab-
lished to assist New London with economic development 9. 2  Governor Row-
land hoped to use state "revenue surpluses" created by the strong state
economy in 1997 to help "catalyze" the struggling economies of Connecti-
cut's heavily democratic cities." One researcher stated the matter this way:
25 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 473; Eric Rutkow, Kelo v. City of New London, 30 HARV. ENvTL. L. REV.
261, 261 (2006); Peggy Cosgrove, New London Development Corporation Case Study, Prepared for
The Am. Assembly at Columbia Univ. (undated), available at http://www.clairegaudiani.com/
Writings/Writings%20PDFs/Economic%2oDevelopment%20PDFs/New%2oLondon%2ODevelopment
%20Corporation%2OCase%20Study.pdf.
26 Cosgrove, supra note 25.
27 Maximilian Tondro, The Baltimore Development Corporation: A Case Study of Economic
Development Corporations, Shadow Government, and the Fight for Public Transparency and Accounta-
bility 8-9 (Dec. 2010) (unpublished independent study, University of Maryland),
http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article- 102 l&context=-mlh_pubs.
Tondro analyzes the decision-making process in Kelo, stating that the belief by the United States Su-
preme Court that
the municipal government had significant control over the redevelopment project or its im-
plementation, contrasts sharply with the actual interaction between the quasi-public devel-
opment corporation and the municipal government. This contrast serves as a point of depar-
ture to explore the court's problematic reliance on the formal approval by the municipal gov-
emnment of the redevelopment project drawn up and implemented by the development corpo-
ration as rendering the project a sufficiently "public purpose" to justify the use of eminent
domain delegated to the development corporation.
Id. at2.
28 See, e.g., id. at 8; see also David Collins, John Rowland Changed New London, THE DAY (Feb.
19, 2014), http://www.theday.com/article/20140219/NWS05/302199934. The former governor went to
prison in 2005 on corruption charges. Id.
29 Tondro, supra note 27, at 8.
30 Cosgrove, supra note 25.
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The catalyst for the reactivation [of the NLDC] came not from the City, but instead from the
state Commissioner of Economic and Community Development, Peter Ellef, who as political
advisor and later co-chief of staff to Governor John Rowland pushed major urban develop-
ment initiatives in heavily Democratic cities to gain political advantage for the Republican
governor in a Democratic state.
31
The NLDC aggressively moved forward with redevelopment plans.
Dr. George M. Milne, Jr., President for Central Research at Pfizer, joined
the board of the NLDC and gradually concluded that the Fort Trumbull area
would be an ideal location for Pfizer's Global Development Facility.32 But
convincing Pfizer of the idea would require a compelling and strong plan.
Governor Rowland responded with a strong state commitment to bring
Pfizer to New London.33
The NLDC hired a prominent urban-planning firm "to ensure that the
new Pfizer facility, with an investment of $180 million in private funds,
would be the centerpiece of a concentrated reuse of the Fort Trumbull pen-
insula, which could also include a hotel, retail space, new housing, and a
half-mile long public riverwalk."34 The plan came together in December
1997, and in December 1998, Pfizer's Board of Directors approved a $300
million Global Development Facility plan for the Fort Trumbull area of
New London to include 600 new jobs, 1,300 existing jobs, and a $125 mil-
lion annual payroll by 2002. 35
The plans to bring Pfizer to Fort Trumbull gained momentum. In 2000,
the New London City Council voted 6-1 to approve the Fort Trumbull Mu-
nicipal Development Plan, designating the NLDC as its development agent
in charge of implementation.36 Later that same year, Corcoran Jennison, a
private firm chosen by the NLDC with public-private development exper-
tise, committed to build research and development offices, a luxury hotel, a
townhouse community, and conference and fitness centers on Fort Trum-
bull. Also, Pfizer announced that the worldwide headquarters for its $4.5
billion development and research division would be in New London.37 "In
addition to creating jobs, generating tax revenue, and helping to 'build mo-
mentum for the revitalization of downtown New London,' the plan was also
designed to make the City more attractive and to create leisure and recrea-
tional opportunities .... "38
31 Tondro, supra note 27, at 8.
32 Id.; Cosgrove, supra note 25.
33 Cosgrove, supra note 25.
34 id.
35 Id.
36 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 475-76 (2005); Cosgrove, supra note 25.
37 Cosgrove, supra note 25.
38 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 474-75 (citation omitted) (quoting Joint Appendix, Vol. 1 at 92, Kelo, 545
U.S. 469 (No. 04-108), 2004 WL 2967525, at *92).
[VOL. 23:2
JUSTICE THOMAS'S KELO DISSENT
The New London City Council authorized the NLDC to purchase
property necessary for the economic-development plan from consenting
property owners and to use eminent domain to condemn the property of
citizens who hoped to prevent the taking of their property-holdouts.39 The-
se "resisting property owners tried to use the political process to prevent the
takings" but had "little, if any, hope of prevailing against the vastly more
powerful forces arrayed against them" (i.e., Governor Rowland and his
administration, state and city leaders, Pfizer, and the NLDC). °
In response to the economic-development plans and the activity of the
NLDC, a group of citizens formed the Coalition to Save Fort Trumbull
("Coalition"). But, without the political influence of many of the "movers
and shakers" who pushed for the exercise of eminent domain in Fort Trum-
bull for economic development, the Coalition had nowhere near the impact
of those who were more politically connected.4 Lloyd Beachy, a New Lon-
don city councilor who had been critical of the NLDC and of New Lon-
don's redevelopment projects, often sided with the Coalition in calling for
the NLDC to move more slowly on its demolition plans.42 In response to the
NLDC's announcement that it had decided not to demolish the Italian Dra-
matic Club, built by Italian immigrants in 1922 and known to have guests
who were politically well-connected,43 Councilman Beachy explained:
"I don't know what it all means, but I see that if you have political connections you can
get anything done in this city .... I'm ecstatic for them but somewhat frustrated as to why
those with less power in the community don't get the same consideration.... People in the
coalition are not the movers and shakers in the community .... As a result, they don't have
the same kind of impact.
' "4
And, at the same time, City Councilor Rob Pero agreed that it could
appear that the Italian Dramatic Club was spared by the NLDC because
many of its supporters were politically well-connected.45 Susctte Kelo, a
working-class homeowner who fought a losing battle to keep her home,
hoped the NLDC's decision to save the Italian Dramatic Club signaled that
39 Id. at 475.
40 lya Somin, The Story Behind Kelo v. City of New London-How an Obscure Takings Case Got
to the Supreme Court and Shocked the Nation, WASH. POST (May 29, 2015), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/05/29/the-story-behind-the-kelo-case-how-an-
obscure-takings-case-came-to-shock-the-conscience-of-the-nation/.
41 Kathleen Edgecomb, Decision to Save Italian Club Questioned, THE DAY (Sept. 21, 2000),
http://www.theday.com/article/20000921/DAYARC/309219943/0/Search.
42 id.
43 Id. ("Months into an urban renewal plan that is changing the landscape in parts of the city, the
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a door to meaningful discussions had opened.46 Other property owners tar-
geted for eminent domain were not so optimistic. But in the end, once state
and local leaders determined that Pfizer could make better use of the target-
ed Fort Trumbull properties than their owners, the political and economic
forces behind these "movers and shakers" were too much for Ms. Kelo and
her neighbors to overcome.47
Many local actors, including affected Fort Trumbull property owners,
perceived that the decision to use eminent domain to take private property
for economic development was politically motivated or, at the very least,
that the majority who supported the plan, many of whom were politically
connected and powerful, were dictating the results.48 Ultimately, however,
the decision to destroy neighborhoods for economic development did not
yield nearly the promised public benefits, prompting Connecticut Supreme
Court Justice Richard Palmer, one of four justices who voted with the 4-3
majority against Ms. Kelo, to apologize to her years later.49 Justice Palmer
wrote that his apology to Ms. Kelo was predicated on facts that he could not
have not have known until after the Connecticut Supreme Court's decision
because they were not in existence at the time-"'namely, that the city's
development plan had never materialized and, as a result, years later, the
land at issue remains barren and wholly undeveloped.""'5 For all that the
government took, the return was urban blight; the land seized by eminent
domain sits vacant.'
The Kelo decision intensified the debate about the extent to which
property rights should receive constitutional protection from majoritarian
influences-political institutions and state legislative bodies-that hold
private-property rights protected by the United States Constitution in low
regard.52 Next, Part II turns to this discussion.
46 Id.
47 See Edgecomb, supra note 41; see also JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER
RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 157 (3d ed. 2008) ("Under Kelo, legislators
appear to hold virtually unlimited power to decide whether eminent domain is appropriate for particular
projects.").
48 Edgecomb, supra note 41.




51 Alec Torres, Nine Years After Kelo, the Seized Land Is Empty, NAT'L REV. (Feb. 5, 2014),
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/370441/nine-years-after-kelo-seized-land-empty-alec-torres
(showing a visual depiction of the Fort Trumbull area today).
52 ELY, supra note 47, at 5, 157.
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II. THE COUNTERMAJORITARIAN DIFFICULTY: THE POLITICAL NATURE
OF PUBLIC USE AND TAKINGS FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
This Part considers the approaches of the majority and dissenting jus-
tices in Kelo, particularly Justice Thomas's dissent, focusing on the Court's
majoritarian approach to private-property-rights protection in the area of
takings and eminent domain. First, it delineates the importance of property
rights for the poor as well as the rich and the role that the Constitution plays
in protecting private-property rights. Then, it turns to Justice Thomas's dis-
sent, discussing the benefits of a countermajoritarian judicial force in the
American democratic system, as represented by Justice Thomas in Kelo,
and why the countermajoritarian difficulty53 may not be so difficult in this
area of the law.
A. Why Constitutional Protection of Property Rights Is Important
When one thinks of property rights, one typically focuses on the
wealthy protecting their largess. But that is a misconception.54 Disadvan-
taged--even poor-people have real property and, indeed, in the context of
eminent domain, these people are the most likely losers because they are
the least politically powerful and their property is worth less.5 So, in some
sense, the poor need the constitutional protections of the Fifth Amend-
ment's Public Use Clause the most because they lack political power and
are more likely than the wealthy to be the victims of eminent domain. 6
Two hundred and forty years ago, Virginia patriot Arthur Lee said,
"The right of property is the guardian of every other right, and to deprive a
people of this, is in fact to deprive them of their liberty.""7 The Public Use
Clause, like the other provisions of the Bill of Rights, was "designed to
limit the scope of majority rule over matters deemed fundamental in a free
53 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR
OF POLITICS 16 (2d ed. 1962). This phrase is attributed to Mr. Bickel who introduced it in his book.
54 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 521-22 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
55 Id.; Brief ofAmici Curiae NAACP et al. in Support of Petitioners, supra note 1, at 11-14 ("The
reason these groups are disproportionately affected is that they are palatable political and economic
targets. Condemnations in predominately minority or elderly neighborhoods are often easier to accom-
plish because these groups are less likely, or often unable, to contest the action,.... The fact that particu-
lar property is identified and designated for 'economic development,' however, almost certainly means
that the market is currently undervaluing that property or that the property has some 'trapped' value that
the market is not currently recognizing. ... Because the neighborhoods chosen are (in large part) select-
ed because of the low market value of the properties therein, these displaced individuals will typically
have a difficult time finding adequate replacement housing.").
56 Brief of Amici Curiae NAACP et al. in Support of Petitioners, supra note I, at 11.
57 ARTHUR LEE, AN APPEAL TO THE JUSTICE AND INTERESTS OF THE PEOPLE OF GREAT BRITAIN,
IN THE PRESENT DISPUTES WITH AMERICA 14 (London, Robson, Angus, & Co., 4th ed. 1776).
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society."58 And the Founders viewed private-property protections as funda-
mental to liberty. 9 After Kelo, the ability of government to take private
property expanded exponentially because of a "jettisoning" of historic con-
stitutional limitations on the exercise of governments' power to take private
property.6 Constitutional limitations can easily be amended-the rules of
the game of politics changed-when these restraints and commitments to
protect the interests of the politically and economically disadvantaged
against majority interests fail.61
The Kelo majority's approach to the Public Use Clause was explicitly
majoritarian. The Court used "the prevailing position of state legislatures-
its proxy for the will of the people-to delineate the contours of constitu-
tional law."62 At the heart of the sharply divided Kelo decision is the reality
of structural inequalities that are inextricably present when the judiciary
allows the majority to exercise the power of law against dissenters (or hold-
outs).63 The public use requirement for the exercise of eminent domain gen-
erates debate because it does not have a fixed, accepted meaning. Kelo
highlights this point-the case's entire outcome turns on what constitutes a
public use, understood to include public purposes.64
Practically all cities, New London included, are laboratories of com-
peting interests. Early uses of eminent domain were for common carriers
and other public and quasi-public projects like highways, mills, manufacto-
ries, and public utilities.65 Justice Stevens and scholars sympathetic to a
broad construction of the public use restriction point to these early uses of
eminent domain by the states to support their positions. Justice Stevens
58 ELY, supra note 47, at 4.
59 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 505 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("Any property may now be taken for the
benefit of another private party, but the fallout from this decision will not be random. The beneficiaries
are likely to be those citizens with disproportionate influence and power in the political process, includ-
ing large corporations and development firms. As for the victims, the government now has license to
transfer property from those with fewer resources to those with more. The Founders cannot have intend-
ed this perverse result. '[T]hat alone is a just government,' wrote James Madison, 'which impartially
secures to every man, whatever is his own,"' (quoting James Madison, Property, NAT'L GAZETTE, Mar.
27, 1792, reprinted in 14 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 266 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1983))).
60 Gideon Kanner, Kelo v. New London: Bad Law, Bad Policy, and Bad Judgment, 38 URB. LAW.
201, 202 (2006).
61 See Mila Versteeg, The Politics of Takings Clauses, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 695, 702 (2015).
62 Corinna Barrett Lain, The Doctrinal Side of Majority Will, 2010 MICH. ST. L. REV. 775, 776
(footnote omitted); see Kelo, 545 U.S. at 480 (discussing judicial deference to legislative judgments in
the field of takings).
63 Laura S. Underkuffler, Kelo 's Moral Failure, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 377, 378 (2006).
64 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 480 ("The disposition of this case ... turns on the question whether the City's
development plan serves a 'public purpose."').
65 Id. at 512 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (discussing the early Mill Acts); ELY, supra note 47, at 77
(discussing the states' aggressive use of eminent domain in the 1800s to promote transportation pro-
jects); John Fee, Reforming Eminent Domain, in EMINENT DOMAIN USE AND ABUSE: KELO IN CONTEXT
125, 129 (Dwight H. Merriam & Mary Massaron Ross eds. 2006).
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wrote in Kelo that many state courts circumvented or completely abandoned
the "'use by the public' test" by authorizing Mill Acts66 that allowed manu-
facturers to flood private upstream lands.67 Others argue that, in the early
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, states permitted private entrepreneurs to
acquire property through the exercise of eminent domain based upon antici-
pated public benefits resulting from the forced transfers.68
But some scholars and jurists, like Justice Thomas, take issue with this
characterization of the Mill Acts and these early exercises of eminent do-
main.69 According to them, gristmills "were America's first businesses 'af-
fected with pubic interest"' and, thus, there is something "poignant about
the suggestion that gristmills might not be public institutions."7 The Court
in Head v. Amoskeag Manufacturing Co.7 stated,
The principle objects, no doubt, of the earlier [general mill] acts were grist mills; and it has
been generally admitted, even by those courts which have entertained the most restricted
view of the legislative power, that a grist mill which grinds for all comers, at tolls fixed by
law, is for a public use.
72
And as one scholar remarked, "it is interesting to note that even before
it was relevant as a matter of law, some common [colonial] practices, such
as those authorized by the Mill Acts, resulted in takings that would satisfy
the modem narrow standard."73 As for practices that would only be counte-
nanced under a much broader standard of public use or public purpose, in
1848 in West River Bridge Co. v. Dix,74 Daniel Webster unsuccessfully ar-
gued before the Supreme Court for strong federal court supervision over
eminent domain by the states. Against eminent domain, he pled:
[O]ur only security is to be found in this tribunal, to keep it within some safe and well-
defined limits, or our State governments will be but unlimited despotisms over the private
citizens. They will soon resolve themselves into the existing will of the existing majority, as
66 Head v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 9, 16-18 (1885) (providing a comprehensive listing of
the early Mill Acts statutes by states).
67 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 479 n.8.
68 See ELY, supra note 47, at 93-94, 129.
69 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 512-15 (Thomas, .1., dissenting) (discussing the early Mill Acts).
70 Gold, supra note 20, at 117.
71 113 U.S. 9 (1885).
72 Id. at 18-19.
73 Charles E. Cohen, Eminent Domain After Kelo v. City of New London: An Argument for Ban-
ning Economic Development Takings, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 491, 503 (2006).
74 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507 (1848). In 1795, the State of Vermont granted the West River Bridge
Company a 100-year franchise to build and operate a toll bridge over West River. Then, in 1843, a
Vermont State court ordered that the bridge could be taken by eminent domain for free public travel
with $4,000 in compensation paid to the owners. Id. at 511-14. This case is described as the first Su-
preme Court case addressing the states' eminent domain power. E.g., Leslie Bender, The Takings
Clause: Principles or Politics?, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 735, 761 (1985).
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to what shall be taken, and what shall be left to any obnoxious natural or artificial person. It
is easy to see, that, by a very slight improvement on the proceedings in this case, and in pur-
suance of the avowed principle, that, as to the exercise of this power of eminent domain, the
legislature, or their agents, are to be the sole judges of what is to be taken, and to what public
use it is to be appropriated, the most levelling ultraisms of Antirentism or agrarianism or
Abolitionism may be successfully advanced.
7 5
Also, those who support strict requirements on public use emphasize
that it is a legal anachronism to compare historic exercises of eminent do-
main with eminent domain used for economic development because many
of the nineteenth and early twentieth century takings involved rural, vacant
land.76 In contrast, many modem economic-development takings, like Kelo,
result in the demolition of densely populated, urban residences and the dis-
placement of massive numbers of inhabitants from their businesses and
homes.77
The arguments of Justices Stevens and Thomas begin at different start-
ing points. Imagine a race track. Justice Stevens's starting point is already
half way towards finding economic-development takings to be within the
definition of public use. In this area, the Court seems to view its proper
function as a majoritarian institution, protecting the interests of states and
localities because these institutions believe economic-development takings
will contribute to long-term economic development and growth, which in-
ure to the benefits of the broader population."
It would appear that Justice Stevens believes that, because the Court
broadly interpreted public use to include public purposes at the end of the
nineteenth century, that should be the starting point for the Kelo argument.79
In making the case for a judicial precedent that has historically embraced a
broad understanding of public purpose, Justice Stevens discusses changing
societal circumstances and evolving societal needs. He argues that these
changing circumstances and evolving needs justify continuing to adhere to
more than a century of public use jurisprudence that, according to Justice
Stevens, "has wisely eschewed rigid formulas and intrusive scrutiny in fa-
vor of affording legislatures broad latitude in determining what public
needs justify the use of the takings power."8 Justice Stevens is comfortable
deferring to legislatures and appropriating authorities to structure the defini-
tion of public purpose, with minimal conditions.8' But leaving this freedom
75 Dix,47 U.S. (6 How.) at 520-21.
76 Kanner, supra note 60, at 206.
77 Id.
78 See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 480 (2005). See generally Versteeg, supra note
61, at 704 (discussing whether constitutional takings clauses are majoritarian).
79 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 479-80.
80 Id. at 483.
81 Id. at 484 ("Given the comprehensive character of the plan, the thorough deliberation that
preceded its adoption, and the limited scope of our review, it is appropriate for us, as it was in Berman,
to resolve the challenges of the individual owners, not on a piecemeal basis, but rather in light of the
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to legislatures and appropriating authorities works to decrease the legal
certainty and constitutional protection that the public purpose requirement
provides."
The Kelo majority's decision to leave the shaping of the understanding
of public purpose to the legislatures and various appropriating authorities,
noting that states remain free to impose further restrictions on the takings
power and the exercise of eminent domain, is a view that resonates among
some advocates of broadly construed eminent domain authority.83 Professor
John D. Echeverria testified before Congress that the Supreme Court was
wise to leave broad discretion with state and local governments on when
and how to use eminent domain for economic development.84 He and others
observe that more than forty states responded to the Kelo decision with
some degree of post-Kelo-reform legislation and some state supreme courts
have interpreted their state takings clauses to prohibit economic-
development takings.85 As Professor Echeverria testified:
The bottom line is that different states have adopted different positions that reflect the values
and preferences of their citizens and the relative need for eminent domain as a tool for urban
revitalization in each state. As the founding fathers intended, the states are not only charting
entire plan. Because that plan unquestionably serves a public purpose, the takings challenged here
satisfy the public use requirement of the Fifth Amendment.").
82 Bj6m Hoops, The Public Purpose for the Expropriation of Land: A Framework for Assessing
Its Democratic Legitimacy 4 (Jan. 4, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssm.coml ab-
stract=2539026.
83 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 489; State of Property Rights in America Ten Years After Kelo v. City of New
London: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution and Civil Justice of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 114th Cong. 41 (2015) (testimony of John D. Echeverria, Professor of Law, Vermont Law
School) [hereinafter Echeverria], http://judiciary.house.gov/index.cfm?a=Files.Serve&File-id=
F9CEA8D7-C974-4A97-B828-A9D5B9E14C36.
84 Echeverria, supra note 83, at 40.
85 Id. at 41; see also Eminent Domain Overview, NAT'L CONFERENCE STATE LEGISLATURES,
http://tinyurl.com/mpph7bf (last visited Jan. 10, 2016). See generally Ilya Somin, The Limits of Back-
lash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2100, 2114-16 (2009) (writing from
the property-owner perspective that economic-development, or person-to-person, condemnations should
be stopped and analyzing the post-Kelo enactments as "effective" or "ineffective"). Professor Somin
states that statutes are said to be effective if "they provide property owners with at least some significant
protection against economic-development condemnations beyond that available under preexisting law"
whereas statutes are said to be ineffective "if they forbid economic-development condemnations but
essentially allow them to continue under another name," such as through a loose definition of "blight."
Id. at 2114. Applying these standards, Professor Somin finds that twenty states have enacted effective
reforms either through state legislation, citizen-initiated referenda, or legislature-initiated referenda,
while twenty-six states have enacted reforms that are ineffective--one by citizen-initiated referendum
and the rest by one of the legislative actions. Id. at 2115. The major loopholes in the ineffective statutes,
according to Professor Somin, are loose definitions of "blight" that include areas that contain "obsta-
cle[s] to 'sound growth' or conditions that constitute an "'economic or social liability."' Id. at 2122.
This criticism extends to popular "blight" definition phrases, such as: 'a menace to the public health,
safety, morals, or welfare[]' . . . because almost any condition that impedes economic development
could be considered a 'menace to the public.., welfare."' Id. at 2122-24 & nn.88-97.
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their own paths but they are serving as the laboratories of democracy, testing different ap-
proaches to the use (and non-use) of eminent domain.
86
But this argument by the Kelo majority and its supporters ignores im-
portant facts about the U.S. Constitution and the workings of the United
States' democratic system, not to mention important realities about the eco-
nomic consequences of economic-development takings. First, enforcing the
Constitution should take precedence over the policies and preferences of
states and localities. Justice O'Connor, who was joined in her Kelo dissent
by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia and Thomas, aptly captured the
appropriate role of judicial deference to the Constitution:
[T]he Court suggests that property owners should turn to the States, who may or may not
choose to impose appropriate limits on economic development takings. This is an abdication
of our responsibility. States play many important functions in our system of dual sovereignty,
but compensating for our refusal to enforce properly the Federal Constitution (and a provi-
sion meant to curtail state action, no less) is not among them.
87
Second, federal courts are not bound by state legislative and judicial
pronouncements on the meaning of public use or public purpose.88 In other
words, state statutory and judicial standards will dictate what constitutes
property under their state systems, but states cannot transform their stand-
ards into federal constitutional standards.89 Finally, a majoritarian approach
to judicial decisionmaking in this area of economic-development takings is
86 Echeverria, supra note 83, at 41-42.
87 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 504 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
88 Id. at 517-18 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("[A] court owes no deference to a legislature's judgment
concerning the quintessentially legal question of whether the government owns, or the public has a legal
right to use, the taken property.").
89 Whittaker v. Cty. of Lawrence, 674 F. Supp. 2d 668, 689-90 (W.D. Pa. 2009), aff'd, 437 F.
App'x 105 (3d Cir. 2011). As the court in Whittaker explained:
States are undoubtedly free to create "public use" standards that are more demanding than
that contained in the Fifth Amendment. Pennsylvania has done just that. Indeed, subsequent
to the Supreme Court's decision in Kelo, the Pennsylvania Legislature passed legislation
generally prohibiting the use of eminent domain power for the purpose of facilitating "pri-
vate enterprise." It does not follow, however, that actions taken in contravention of such state
proscriptions are likewise taken in contravention of the Public Use Clause. The content of the
Public Use Clause does not "vary from place to place and from time to time." The "public
use" requirement is "coterminous with the scope of a sovereign's police powers." It does not
change based on how a particular sovereign chooses to use (or not use) its police powers. As
far as the United States Constitution is concerned, a "public use" in Connecticut is a "public
use" in Pennsylvania. The Plaintiffs attempt to convert state statutory standards into federal
constitutional requirements, "[b]ut constitutional law does not work that way." If the Plain-
tiffs' argument were to be accepted, every taking effectuated for a "purpose" proscribed by
state law would be transformed into a federal constitutional violation. The reasoning em-
ployed by the Supreme Court in... Kelo does not countenance such a result.
Id. (footnote omitted) (citations omitted) (quoting Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 815 (1996);
Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 286 (1990); Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S.
229, 240 (1984)).
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severely undermined by the evidence that, most often, the kinds of econom-
ic-development takings like the one in Kelo that led Justice Stevens to hold
that it "unquestionably serves a public purpose"9 do not yield the positive
fiscal impacts that are touted in order to induce states to exercise eminent
domain.9 In 2014, economists Carrie B. Kerekes and Dean Stansel reported
that their research found no statistically significant correlation between
state and local tax revenue levels and eminent domain.92 To the contrary,
they documented a significantly negative relationship between future state
and local tax revenue growth and eminent domain.93
Equipped with an understanding of why constitutional protection is
particularly important to the disadvantaged in the eminent domain context,
this Essay now focuses on Justice Thomas and his dissent in Kelo.
B. Justice Thomas's Kelo Dissent
Justice Thomas joined Justice O'Connor's principal dissent and also
authored a compelling dissent of his own, in which he took a
countermajoritarian approach to judicial review of the Public Use Clause
and argued for an originalist interpretation." Justice Thomas's dissent was
consistent with what seems to be his judicial philosophy that the judiciary
should "scrape off misguided precedent, however venerable."95 And, in fact,
Justice Thomas is a frequent dissenter, having dissented, in whole or in
part, in more than 54 percent of the Supreme Court cases in which he has
participated."6
Justice Thomas's starting point is rooted in the Constitution and his
understanding of the original intent of the Fifth Amendment as a check on
governmental power.97 Unlike the majority, he does not begin by focusing
on the legislature or the popular will; rather, he employs a starkly
90 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 484.
91 Carrie B. Kerekes & Dean Stansel, Takings and Tax Revenue: Fiscal Impacts of Eminent Do-
main 4-5, 35-36 (George Mason Univ. Mercatus Ctr. Working Paper, 2014), http://mercatus.org/sites/
default/files/Kerekes-Eminent-Domain.pdf.
92 Id. at 5.
93 Id
94 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 506 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating that the decision ignores "original mean-
ing" and renders "the Public Use Clause to be a virtual nullity").
95 RALPH A. ROSSUM, UNDERSTANDING CLARENCE THOMAS: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF
CONSTITUTIONAL RESTORATION 134 (2014).
96 Writings by Justice Thomas, CORNELL LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/
supct/author.php?thomas (last visited Jan. 10, 2016). One scholar describes the American dissenter
(generally speaking) as a "nonconformist" who bears "the scorn of the herd whose collective thinking he
challenges. He is the heretic whose heresy may not stand the rays of established thought or the spectrum
of time. Or he may be the prophet whose heresy of today becomes the dogma of tomorrow." PERCIVAL
E. JACKSON, DISSENT IN THE SUPREME COURT: A CHRONOLOGY 3 (1969).
97 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 506-07 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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countermajoritarian approach. 98 Justice Thomas supports his narrow inter-
pretation of the Public Use Clause with a historic reading of the text of the
Public Use Clause as a prohibition on government exercise of power and
not a grant of power.99 Further, he is not wedded to the pronouncements of
the nineteenth century Supreme Court on the meaning of public use in the
Takings Clause."' He writes that, "without the slightest nod to its original
meaning[,]" the Court continues on a path of eviscerating the efficacy of the
Public Use Clause as a meaningful limitation on the exercise of the power
of eminent domain by the government.'' Justice Thomas would have the
Court "reconsider" all of these cases which he believes have misconstrued
the Public Use Clause and, in so doing, limited the efficacy of the Supreme
Court as a bulwark against majoritarian abuses of power.
Many people speak of private-property rights as though they are a hin-
drance to poor people, and private-property-rights advocates are often
villainized and blamed for many of the social ills of the past, including ra-
cial inequality, social injustices, and poverty. Critics of private-property-
rights advocates argue that the work of these individuals inevitably ends up
supporting the wealthy and corporate-property rights.
In his Kelo dissent, Justice Thomas draws a stark contrast to this nega-
tive view of private-property rights. According to his contrasting view, a
robust system of private-property rights and protections is essential to the
establishment and maintenance of functioning democracies and markets, as
well as individual liberty. He writes:
The consequences of today's decision are not difficult to predict, and promise to be harmful.
So-called "urban renewal" programs provide some compensation for the properties they take,
but no compensation is possible for the subjective value of these lands to the individuals dis-
placed and the indignity inflicted by uprooting them from their homes. Allowing the gov-
eminent to take property solely for public purposes is bad enough, but extending the concept
of public purpose to encompass any economically beneficial goal guarantees that these losses
will fall disproportionately on poor communities. Those communities are not only systemati-
cally less likely to put their lands to the highest and best social use, but are also the least po-
litically powerful. If ever there were justification for intrusive judicial review of constitution-
al provisions that protect "discrete and insular minorities," surely that principle would apply
with great force to the powerless groups and individuals the Public Use Clause protects. The
deferential standard this Court has adopted for the Public Use Clause is therefore deeply per-
verse. It encourages "those citizens with disproportionate influence and power in the political
process, including large corporations and development firms," to victimize the weak. 1
02
At its core, Justice Thomas's Kelo dissent may be understood as an
expression of concern about a "public interest" test inherent in the Kelo
98 Id. at 506.
99 Id. at 511.
100 Id. at 506.
lOt Id.
102 Id. at 521-22 (citation omitted) (quoting id at 505 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); United States v.
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)).
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decision. °3 He argues that, if we depart from the natural meaning and un-
derstanding of "public use" and substitute other concepts like public inter-
est, then "we are afloat without any certain principle to guide us."" And, if
there is not a dime's worth of difference between public interest and politi-
cal interest-which is determined in the arena of politics-then, in many
ways, Kelo is tethered to an accordion notion of the role of government.
The United States is presently in an environment of an expanding notion of
what government should and ought to be providing, and, in Kelo, the Court
is the accordion player.0 5 As Justice O'Connor aptly stated in her Kelo dis-
sent, joined by Justice Thomas,
If legislative prognostications about the secondary public benefits of a new use can legiti-
mate a taking, there is nothing in the Court's rule... to prohibit property transfers generated
with less care, that are less comprehensive, that happen to result from less elaborate process,
whose only projected advantage is the incidence of higher taxes, or that hope to transform an
already prosperous city into an even more prosperous one.106
III. HOLDING OUT AND HOLDING ON
Kelo certainly was not the first decision that can be questioned on the
ground that it permitted the takings of the homes of poor-and-middle-class
citizens and subsequent transfer to the wealthy-all in the name of econom-
ic development. 7 Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit 'o' is
103 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 520 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
1o4 Id. (quoting Bloodgood v. Mohawk & Hudson R.R., 18 Wend. 9, 61 (N.Y. 1837) (opinion of
Tracy, Sen.)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
105 Michael Schuyler, A Short History of Government Taxing and Spending in the United States,
TAX FOUND (Feb. 19, 2014), http://taxfoundation.org/article/short-history-govemment-taxing-and-
spending-united-states (discussing dramatic federal government expansion in the 20th century and
continued expansion in the 21st century); Jim VandeHei, Blueprint Calls for Bigger, More Powerful
Government, WASH. POST (Feb. 9, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A9307-
2005Feb8.html ("President Bush's second-term agenda would expand not only the size of the federal
government but also its influence over the lives of millions of Americans by imposing new national
restrictions on high schools, court cases and marriages."); Douglas J. Amy, Why We Need More, Not
Less, Government, GOV'T is GOOD, http://www.govemmentisgood.com/articles.php?aid=8 (last visited
Jan. 10, 2016) ("For decades, conservatives have been pushing for smaller government, and have con-
sistently called for reduced social spending, less regulation, and more tax cuts. But not everyone agrees.
When the financial crisis hit in the fall of 2008 and the economy began to melt down, suddenly there
were calls for bigger and more active government. Many people wanted a massive federal stimulus plan
to ward off an economic depression, and others demanded the widespread re-regulation of financial
markets to prevent a recurrence of these problems."); Bailout Recipients, PROPUBLICA,
https://projects.propublica.org/bailout/list (last visited Jan. 10, 2016).
106 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 504 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
107 Brett D. Liles, Reconsidering Poletown: In the Wake of Kelo, States Should Move to Restore
Private Property Rights, 48 ARIz. L. REV. 369,374-75 (2006).
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an oft-cited example, and one that Justice Thomas used, which highlights
the enduring and tragic struggle by poor and minority communities against
the majoritarian power."°9 This Part begins with a discussion of the holdout"problem" that is often cited as support for the use of the taking power and
eminent domain for economic development. Next, it evaluates Kelo within
the context of the Michigan Supreme Court's decisions in Poletown and
County of Wayne v. Hathcock,"° the latter in which the court returned to a
narrow view of public use under Michigan's constitution-thus reversing
its earlier decision in Poletown."' Further, this Part highlights the starkly
different outcomes in the Michigan Supreme Court and the United States
Supreme Court regarding the viability of economic-development takings.
Finally, it emphasizes an important test offered by the Hathcock court to
measure the constitutionality of takings for economic development that the
United States Supreme Court should have used in Kelo.
A. Holdouts: A False Problem
One popular justification for a broad construction of the Public Use
Clause is that governments need to have latitude to take private property
through eminent domain to overcome land ownership fractionation and
"holdouts"-private property owners who, in the face of infrastructure and
redevelopment projects, refuse to sell. In other words, if land is divided
among many owners, redevelopment and infrastructure projects can be
thwarted completely or delayed to the point that they become cost prohibi-
tive by owners who either do not want to sell their property at any price or
who hope to reap a windfall profit." 2 Some describe holdouts as a "prob-
lem.""' 3 Others take an even more uncharitable view of holdouts. Consider
what Andrew Alpern, attorney, architect, and architectural historian, and his
coauthor Seymour Durst, real estate investor and developer, wrote in their
influential book, Holdouts!:
People who are holdouts come in several varieties. Most pathetic is the frightened hold-
out. The woman who has lived in the same place for fifty years and is panicked by the idea of
being uprooted; the father who is worried that no landlord will accept his retarded son ....
Then there is the greedy holdout, who thinks that every developer controls a purse of un-
limited depth and that no price is too high to demand....
t08 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981) (per curiam), overruled by Cty. of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684
N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004).
109 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 522 (Thomas J., dissenting); see also POLETOWN LIVES! (Information Facto-
ry, Inc. 1982) (documentary film from the perspectives of the Poletown residents who fought the Gen-
eral Motors project that displaced them).
t10 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004).
111 Id. at 787 (overruling Poletown partly "to vindicate [Michigan's] Constitution").
112 Echeverria, supra note 83, at 38.
113 id.
[VOL. 23:2
JUSTICE THOMAS'S KELO DISSENT
There is a very small group of real estate people who are professional holdouts....
Finally there is the foolish holdout. Motivated by spite, by a need to defy anyone in a
position of perceived power or authority, by a desire for publicity or notoriety, or by sheer
cussedness, this sort of holdout is perhaps the most difficult to deal with because he cannot
be reached with reason and will not respond to rational offers. 114
According to this view, there is nothing praiseworthy or honorable
about those who stand in the way of the Kelo majority's notion of progress
or public good. One commentator recently described these individuals, like
Ms. Kelo, as a "problem that afflicts infrastructure projects [and] also
commonly afflicts redevelopment projects of the kind at issue in the Kelo
case."" 5 The same commentator suggested that these people stand in the
way of revitalizing American cities and suburbs, proving the need for the
use of eminent domain to "facilitate urban revitalization."' 16
These views are problematic on numerous counts, but two stand out.
First, they are anathema to a fundamental notion that one of the rights of
property owners is the right to say no, to exclude-the right to holdout."7
Understanding the right to holdout as an extension of the right to exclude
elevates it to a right that, as Justice Rehnquist once observed, is "universal-
ly held to be a fundamental element of the property right.""' Certainly,
property rights are not absolute, but neither are they as porous as these dis-
paraging views of holdouts suggest. And neither are holdouts-property
owners merely exercising fundamental rights-deserving of these disparag-
ing views.
Second, this virtual disdain of holdouts in the face of urban economic
development completely ignores the real and substantive challenges that
legal and economic scholars have raised about the veracity of the holdout
explanation as a justification for eminent domain. In their paper, Takings
and Tax Revenue: Fiscal Impacts of Eminent Domain, economists Carrie
Kerekes and Dean Stansel cite to work from as early as 1976 that raises real
challenges to the validity of the holdout justification." 9 They argue that
eminent domain actually hampers economic development because of the
economic inefficiencies eminent domain introduces, explaining "that tak-
ings for private economic development result in zero-sum games" and chal-
lenging the idea that eminent domain is "more efficient than the private
114 ANDREW ALPERN & SEYMOUR DURST, HOLDOUTS!: THE BUILDINGS THAT GOT IN THE WAY I
(3d ed. 2011).
115 Echeverria, supra note 83, at 38.
116 Id. at 39.
117 Famously, in Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979), the United States Su-
preme Court said that the right to exclude others was "one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of
rights that are commonly characterized as property."
118 d. at 179-80.
119 Kerekes & Stansel, supra note 91, at 9.
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sector at assembling land."' 2 Kerekes and Stansel use what they describe as
a more precise model for testing the fiscal impacts of eminent domain and
"fail to find evidence of a statistically significant relationship between emi-
nent domain activity and the level of state and local government reve-
nue." 2 ' Despite these truths, states diverge on their treatment of eminent
domain post-Kelo.
B. The Eminent-Domain "'Laboratories'" and the Virtue of Michigan
Many states remain strong supporters of eminent domain for economic
development 22 despite (1) evidence of the lack of a positive correlation
between eminent domain and state and local revenue; 23 (2) targeting of
politically disadvantaged and disenfranchised groups for eminent domain; 24
and (3) "the exacerbating effects of eminent domain for private develop-
ment [on the poor.]' 25 In these states, the majority and politically powerful
appear unaware or unconcerned about the real costs and disproportionate
effects on especially vulnerable populations caused by eminent domain for
economic development. This impact has earned the name, the "reverse Rob-
in Hood."'' 26 While the heroic Robin Hood stole from the wealthy and gave
to the poor, Kelo-esque exercises of eminent domain for economic devel-
opment take from those who have the least and give to the Pfizers of the
world. 27
Not every state has been so charitable toward an expanded notion of
public use and virtually unchecked powers in the realm of takings. 21 Mich-
igan is an example of a state that has pushed back against economic- devel-
opment takings. 29 While the Kelo case was working its way through the
federal court system, the Michigan Supreme Court was reconsidering its
1981 decision in Poletown v. City of Detroit.30 Poletown was the state ana-
logue of Kelo; it blessed economic-development takings and a broad inter-
pretation of public use or purpose. And there are important analogies to be
drawn between Poletown and Kelo-most notably, the intensely political
120 id.
121 Id. at 17.
122 Echeverria, supra note 83, at 40; Kerekes & Stansel, supra note 91, at 24, 57.
123 Kerekes & Stansel, supra note 91, at 24, 57.
124 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 521-23 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Carpenter
& Ross, supra note 1, at 2456.
125 Carpenter & Ross, supra note 1, at 2456.
126 Id. at 2457; Kanner, supra note 60, at 206.
127 Carpenter & Ross, supra note 1, at 2456; Kanner, supra note 60, at 206.
128 SOMIN, supra note 2, at 142 (discussing post-Kelo state reforms).
129 BriefofAmici Curiae NAACP et al. in Support of Petitioners, supra note 1, at 19.
130 Cty. of Wayne v. Hatheock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 787 (Mich. 2004) (overruling Poletown Neigh-
borhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981) (per curiam)).
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nature of the decision to take in both cases and the failure of the promised
economic returns that, for the majority in each case, justified the takings."'
The Poletown neighborhood was condemned under a plan by the Detroit
Economic Development Corporation for transfer to General Motors
("GM"), a private corporation.'32 The plan called for construction of an as-
sembly plant in order to promote industry and commerce, add jobs, increase
taxes, and improve the economic base of Detroit and of the state.'33 In a
landmark 5-2 decision, the Michigan Supreme Court ruled against the resi-
dents and rejected their argument that the exercise of eminent domain was
unconstitutional because the primary beneficiary of the condemnation was a
private entity, not the public.'34 Dissenting from the Poletown majority,
Justice Fitzgerald wrote:
Now that we have authorized local legislative bodies to decide that a different commercial or
industrial use of property will produce greater public benefits than its present use, no home-
owner's, merchant's or manufacturer's property, however productive or valuable to its own-
er, is immune from condemnation for the benefit of other private interests that will put it to a
"higher" use. 135
Justice O'Connor, in her Kelo dissent, remarked on the prescience of
Justice Fitzgerald's warning in Poletown.136 Ultimately, just as in Kelo, the
promised economic benefits that justified the Poletown majority's decision
to permit the taking did not come to fruition. 37
131 John J. Bukowczyk, The Decline and Fall of a Detroit Neighborhood- Poletown vs. G.M. and
the City of Detroit, 41 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 49, 60-64 (1984) (discussing the influence of state and
federal legislation, G.M.'s promises ofjobs and revenue, and the diverse and complicated motives of the
political actors involved); Ilya Somin, Overcoming Poletown: County of Wayne v. Hathcock, Economic
Development Takings, and the Future of Public Use, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1005, 1013 (noting that
even at the peak of the 1990's boom, the GM plant's workers numbered "less than 60% of the promised
6,150").
132 Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 457.
133 Id. For a history of the Poletown community, see Bukowczyk, supra note 13 1.
134 Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 460.
135 Id. at 464 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting).
136 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 504-05 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting
id.).
137 The Castle Coalition has stated:
In the 1981 Poletown decision, a seminal case credited with providing the rationale for
the widespread use of eminent domain for private profit, the Michigan Supreme Court al-
lowed the City of Detroit to seize and bulldoze an entire neighborhood so General Motors
could build an auto plant. In total, more than 4,200 people were displaced from their homes,
and the government's wrecking ball claimed 140 businesses, 6 churches, several non-profits
and one hospital. GM paid Detroit S8 million for the property, while the City paid more than
$200 million to acquire and prepare the land for the automobile giant. A total of S150 million
in federal loans and grants, combined with more than $30 million in state government funds,
enabled the City to make the purchase.
Remarkably, in addition to destroying a historic, racially diverse community, the rede-
velopment project failed to meet its many promises and expectations. Detroit Mayor Cole-
man Young and General Motors promised that the redevelopment project would create more
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The Michigan Supreme Court overruled Poletown twenty-three years
later in County of Wayne v. Hathcock.3 8 The Hathcock court called the
Poletown decision a "radical and unabashed departure" from its eminent
domain jurisprudence.'39 It rejected the Poletown majority's extreme defer-
ence to the legislature's determination of what is a public purpose,4 ' even
quoting Justice Ryan's Poletown dissent, in which he stated:
In point of fact, this Court has never employed the minimal standard of review in an em-
inent domain case which is adopted by the majority in this case. Notwithstanding explicit
legislative findings, this Court has always made an independent determination of what con-
stitutes a public use for which the power of eminent domain may be utilized. 141
Article 10, section 2 of the 1963 Michigan Constitution authorized
condemnation of private property for public use and upon payment of just
compensation.'4 2 According to the court, "public use" was the operative
phrase, and it held that the public use requirement can be met when con-
demned property is transferred to a private entity when one of three tests is
met. Citing to Justice Ryan's Poletown dissent, the Hathcock court articu-
lated three independent tests that could justify exercise of eminent domain
and transfer of private property to a private corporation in cases not involv-
ing instrumentalities of commerce: (1) the condemnation involves "ex-
treme" public necessity; (2) "the private entity remains accountable to the
public in its use" of the condemned property; and (3) selection of the con-
demned land "is itself based on public concern." '43
Why is it that, as was the case in Poletown and Kelo, "[i]t is common
that the rosy projections made when redevelopment projects are com-
menced fall short of reality"?'" The answer is because those who promise
redevelopment are often not held accountable.'4 5 Importantly, the Hathcock
court addressed the accountability problem in articulating these three tests.
than 6,000 jobs-but when all was said and done, the plant employed less than half that
many. By 1988, the plant employed merely 2,500 people. In fact, it is estimated that the de-
struction of the entire Poletown neighborhood probably resulted in a net loss of jobs. The
City's own estimates conclude that about one-third of the businesses displaced by the project
closed immediately. This underscores even further just how much of a failure the project
was.
CASTLE COAL., INST. FOR JUSTICE, REDEVELOPMENT WRECKS: 20 FAILED PROJECTS INVOLVING
EMINENT DOMAIN ABUSE 5-6 (2006) (footnotes omitted), http://castlecoalition.org/pdf/
publications/Redevelopment%20Wrecks.pdf.
138 684 N.W.2d 765, 787 (Mich. 2004).
139 Id. at 785.
140 Id. at 785-87 (quoting Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 475 (Ryan, J., dissenting)).
141 Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 475 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
142 Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 779 (quoting MICH. CONST. art. X, § 2.)
143 Id. at 781-83 (citing Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 478 (Ryan, J. dissenting)).
144 Kanner, supra note 60, at 225.
145 SOMIN, supra note 2, at 76-78.
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C. If the Hathcock Tests Had Been Applied to Kelo
If the United States Supreme Court had considered the Hathcock tests,
the result in Kelo likely would have been different. First, the Hathcock
court understood extreme public necessity'" to be limited to "those enter-
prises generating public benefits whose very existence depends on the use
of land that can be assembled only by the coordination central government
alone is capable of achieving."'47 And the court listed "instrumentalities of
commerce" like highways, canals, and railroads as exemplars of this type of
necessity.'48 Office and business parks are inherently different in their de-
sign from these types of instrumentalities of commerce and, therefore, ac-
cording to the Hathcock court, do not require the same type of coordinated
government effort to achieve them. " 9 Railways and highways need to be
straight and connected, and centers of business enterprise do not demand
the same connectedness and precision of location. 5 °
Second, the lack of binding obligations in Kelo,'5' Poletown,5 2 and
Hathcock'". meant that the new owners were not required to produce the
146 See Robert C. Bird & Lynda J. Oswald, Necessity as a Check on State Eminent Domain Power,
12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 99 (2010) (arguing for a revival of the necessity doctrine as a constraint on the
exercise of eminent domain).
147 Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 781 (quoting Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 478 (Ryan, J., dissenting))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
148 Id. (quoting Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 478 (Ryan, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
149 Id. at 783-84.
150 Id. at 781-83.
151 See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text (discussing the failure of the Pfizer project to
deliver the promised economic benefits).
152 Justice Ryan aptly raised the issue of accountability:
One of the reasons advanced by the defendants as justification of the taking in this case,
and adopted by the majority, is the claim of alleviation of unemployment. Even assuming,
arguendo, that employment per se is a "necessity of the extreme sort", there are no guaran-
tees from General Motors about employment levels at the new assembly plant. General Mo-
tors has made representations about the number of employees who will work at the new
plant, and I certainly do not doubt the good faith of those representations. But the fact of the
matter is that once CIP is sold to General Motors, there will be no public control whatsoever
over the management, or operation, or conduct of the plant to be built there. General Motors
will be accountable not to the public, but to its stockholders. Who knows what the automo-
tive industry will look like in 20 years, or even 10? For that matter, who knows what cars
will look like then? For all that can be known now, in light of present trends, the plant could
be fully automated in 10 years. Amid these uncertainties, however, one thing is certain. The
level of employment at the new GM plant will be determined by private corporate managers
primarily with reference, not to the rate of regional unemployment, but to profit.
By permitting the condemnation in this case, this Court has allowed the use of the public
power of eminent domain without concomitant public accountability.
Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 480 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
153 Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 784 ("The public benefit arising from the [project] is an epiphenome-
non of the eventual property owners' collective attempts at profit maximization. No formal mechanisms
exist to ensure that the businesses that would occupy what are now defendants' properties will continue
to contribute to the health of the local economy.").
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promised benefits that were relied upon to justify the use of eminent do-
main.'54 As Justice Ryan so appropriately observed in his Poletown dissent,
public officials had no control over GM's market-based hiring decisions
because "employment at the new GM plant [was] determined by private
corporate managers primarily with reference, not to the rate of regional
unemployment, but to profit."'55 Perhaps unsurprisingly then, absent any
legally binding obligations in the Kelo and Poletown cases, the promised
benefits ultimately fell short.
Third, in Kelo, there were no facts of independent public significance,
unrelated to the private interests of Pfizer, that warranted the exercise of
eminent domain. This was also the case in Poletown'56 and Hathcock.'57 In
other words, the only public benefits cited to justify the Kelo condemna-
tions were benefits that would arise after the private properties were con-
demned and transferred to Pfizer. There was nothing about the pure act of
the condemnations themselves that created a public benefit. The condemned
properties were not blighted or in disrepair and many were occupied resi-
dences-so no public safety or health needs were promoted by the takings
due to such justifications as blight remediation. 5 8 This fact distinguished
the condemnations in Kelo from those in Berman v. Parker'59 and Hawaii
Housing Authority v. Midkiff6" that Justice Stevens cited as evidence of the
Court's deference to state courts and state legislatures in determining when
the use of the taking power is justified by public needs.'6 ' Justice O'Connor,
author of the majority opinion in Midkiff pushed back on the Kelo majori-
ty's use of these two cases as guiding precedents.'62 In her Kelo dissent,
Justice O'Connor wrote:
Yet for all the emphasis on deference, Berman and Midkiff hewed to a bedrock principle
without which our public use jurisprudence would collapse: "A purely private taking could
not withstand the scrutiny of the public use requirement; it would serve no legitimate purpose
of government and would thus be void."....
The Court's holdings in Berman and Midkiff were true to the principle underlying the
Public Use Clause. In both those cases, the extraordinary, precondemnation use of the target-
ed property inflicted affirmative harm on society-in Berman through blight resulting from
extreme poverty and in Midkiffthrough oligopoly resulting from extreme wealth. And in both
cases, the relevant legislative body had found that eliminating the existing property use was
154 SOMIN, supra note 2, at 76.
155 Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 480 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
156 Id. (stating that facts of private-not public-significance dictated the choice of the Central
Industrial Park location).
157 Hahcock, 684 N.W.2d at 784 (stating that the only public benefits arise only after the condem-
nation and transfer into private hands and that there was nothing about the condemnation act itself that
served a public good).
158 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 500-01 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
159 348 U.S. 26(1954).
160 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
161 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 483.
162 Id. at 499-501 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
[VOL. 23:2
JUSTICE THOMAS'S KELO DISSENT
necessary to remedy the harm. Thus a public purpose was realized when the harmful use was
eliminated. Because each taking directly achieved a public benefit, it did not matter that the
property was turned over to private use. Here, in contrast, New London does not claim that
Susette Kelo's... well-maintained home[] [is] the source of any social harm.1
63
As Justice Stevens suggested, might the answer to the Kelo problem
lie with the states that have the ability to enact more restrictions on the ex-
ercise of the power to take if they do not like the United States Supreme
Court's expanding use of the Public Use Clause in favor of economic de-
velopment? 64 Certainly, post-Kelo, many states responded with reforms
designed to limit or forbid condemnations for economic development. 5
But how effective might these post-Kelo restrictive state statutes be when
the exercise of eminent domain for economic development is analyzed un-
der federal law? The answer is: not very. For example, in Whittaker v.
County of Lawrence,'66 the federal district court declined to apply a restric-
tive definition of "blight" from a Pennsylvania statute in a Fifth Amend-
ment challenge to the use of eminent domain to support a high-tech busi-
ness park development.'67 In refusing to apply the state statutory restrictions
on the use of eminent domain, the court stated that, "[a]s far as the United
States Constitution is concerned, a 'public use' in Connecticut is a 'public
use' in Pennsylvania. The Plaintiffs attempt to convert state statutory stand-
ards into federal constitutional requirements, '[b]ut constitutional law does
not work that way."" 6
CONCLUSION
As Justice Scalia once said, some issues "come before the Court clad,
so to speak, in sheep's clothing: the potential of the asserted principle to
effect important change in the equilibrium of power is not immediately
evident, and must be discerned by a careful and perceptive analysis. But
this wolf comes as a wolf.' 6 9 And the same is true of Kelo-the wolf
comes as a wolf, and it comes as a wolf to prey on the most vulnerable and
least politically powerful groups. Destabilization, disenfranchisement of
vulnerable groups, illusive and incidental benefits-these are the concerns
of the Kelo dissenters, particularly Justice Thomas. The Hathcock tests ad-
dress some of these concerns in the state constitutional context while also
163 Id. at 500 (citations omitted) (quoting Midkiff 467 U.S. at 245).
164 Id. at 489 (majority opinion).
165 Echeverria, supra note 83, at 41.
166 674 F. Supp. 2d 668 (W.D. Pa. 2009), aft'd, 437 F. App'x 105 (3d Cir. 2011).
167 Id. at 688-89.
168 Id. at 689-90 (footnote omitted) (quoting Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,
286 (1990)).
169 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 699 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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hewing more closely to the original meaning of the Public Use Clause as
eloquently expressed by Justice Thomas. In the absence of such limitations
and as the frequency and magnitude of these joint ventures increase, so too
does the distance between the original understanding of the Public Use
Clause and the legitimate exercise of the eminent domain power when the
state participates in economic development. 7 '
170 See Brown, supra note 1, at 149-64.
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